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Abstract
This note is my comment on Glenn Shafer’s discussion paper “Testing
by betting” [15], together with an online appendix comparing p-values
and betting scores.
The version of this note at http://alrw.net/e (Working Paper 8) is
updated most often.
Main comment
Glenn Shafer’s paper is a powerful appeal for a wider use of betting ideas and
intuitions in statistics. He admits that p-values will never be completely replaced
by betting scores, and I discuss it further in Appendix A (one of the two online
appendices that I have prepared to meet the word limit). Both p-values and
betting scores generalize Cournot’s principle [13], but they do it in their different
ways, and both ways are interesting and valuable.
Other authors have referred to betting scores as Bayes factors [16] and e-
values [23, 7]. For simple null hypotheses, betting scores and Bayes factors
indeed essentially coincide [7, Section 1, interpretation 3], but for composite
null hypotheses they are different notions, and using “Bayes factor” to mean
“betting score” is utterly confusing to Bayesians [11]. However, the Bayesian
connection still allows us to apply Jeffreys’s [9, Appendix B] rule of thumb to
betting scores; namely, a p-value of 5% is roughly equivalent to a betting score
of 101/2, and a p-value of 1% to a betting score of 10. This agrees beautifully
with Shafer’s rule (6), which gives, to two decimal places:
• for p = 5%, 3.47 instead of Jeffreys’s 3.16 (slight overshoot);
• for p = 1%, 9 instead of Jeffreys’s 10 (slight undershoot).
The term “e-values” emphasizes the fundamental role of expectation in the
definition of betting scores (somewhat similar to the role of probability in the
definition of p-values). It appears that the natural habitat for “betting scores”
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is game-theoretic while for “e-values” it is measure-theoretic [14]; therefore, I
will say “e-values” in the online appendices (Appendix A and [19]), which are
based on measure-theoretic probability.
In the second online appendix [19] I give a new example showing that bet-
ting scores are not just about communication; they may allow us to solve real
statistical and scientific problems (more examples will be given by my co-author
Ruodu Wang). David Cox [4] discovered that splitting data at random not only
allows flexible testing of statistical hypotheses but also achieves high efficiency.
A serious objection to the method is that different people analyzing the same
data may get very different answers (thus violating “inferential reproducibility”
[6, 8]). Using e-values instead of p-values remedies the situation.
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A Cournot’s principle, p-values, and e-values
This is an online appendix to the main comment. It is based, to a large degree,
on Glenn Shafer’s ideas about the philosophy of statistics. After a brief discus-
sion of p-values and e-values as different extensions of Cournot’s principle, I list
some of their advantages and disadvantages.
A.1 Three ways of testing
Both p-values and e-values are developments of Cournot’s principle [13], which
is referred to simply as the standard way of testing in Shafer’s [15, Section 2.1].
If a given event has a small probability, we do not expect it to happen; this is
Cournot’s bridge between probability theory and the world. (This bridge was
discussed already by James Bernoulli [2]; Cournot’s [3] contribution was to say
that this is the only bridge.) See Figure 1.
Figure 1: Cournot’s principle and its two generalizations
Cournot’s principle requires an a priori choice of a rejection region E. Its
disadvantage is that it is binary: either the null hypothesis is completely rejected
or we find no evidence whatsoever against it. A p-variable is a nonnegative
random variable p such that, for any α ∈ (0, 1), P (p ≤ α) ≤ α; one way to
define p-variables is via Shafer’s (3). An e-variable is a nonnegative random
variable e such that EP (e) ≤ 1; one way to define e-variables is via Shafer’s
first displayed equation in Section 2. In p-testing, we choose a p-variable p in
advance and reject the null hypothesis P when the observed value of p (the
p-value) is small, and in e-testing, we choose an e-variable e in advance and
reject the null hypothesis P when the observed value of e (the e-value) is large.
In both cases, binary testing becomes graduated: now we have a measure of the
amount of evidence found against the null hypothesis.
We can embed Cournot’s principle into both p-testing,
p(y) :=
{
α if y ∈ E
1 if not,
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and e-testing (as Shafer [15, Section 2.1, (1)] explains),
e(y) :=
{
1/α if y ∈ E
0 if not,
where α := P (E).
There are numerous ways to transform p-values to e-values (to calibrate
them) and essentially one way (e 7→ 1/e) to transform e-values to p-values,
as discussed in detail in [22]. The idea of calibrating p-values originated in
Bayesian statistics ([1, Section 4.2], [18, Section 9], [12]), and there is a wide
range of admissible calibrators. Transforming e-values into p-values is referred
to as e-to-p calibration in [22], where e 7→ 1/e is shown to dominate any e-to-p
calibrator [22, Proposition 2.2].
Moving between the p-domain and e-domain is, however, very inefficient.
Borrowing the idea of “round-trip efficiency” from energy storage, let us start
from the highly statistically significant (≤ 1%) p-value 0.5%, transform it to an
e-value using Shafer’s [15, (6)] calibrator
S(0.005) =
1√
0.005
≈ 13.14,
and then transform it back to a p-value using the only admissible e-to-p cali-
brator: 1/13.14 ≈ 0.076. The resulting p-value of 7.6% is not even statistically
significant (> 5%).
A.2 Some comparisons
Both p-values and e-values have important advantages, and I think they should
complement (rather than compete with) each other. Let me list a few advantages
of each that come first to mind. Advantages of p-values:
• P-values can be more robust to our assumptions (perhaps implicit). Sup-
pose, for example, that our null hypothesis is simple. When we have a
clear alternative hypothesis (always assumed simple) in mind, the likeli-
hood ratio has a natural property of optimality as e-variable (Shafer [15,
Section 2.2]), and the p-variable corresponding to the likelihood ratio as
test statistic is also optimal (Neyman–Pearson lemma [10, Section 3.2,
Theorem 1]). For some natural classes of alternative hypotheses, the re-
sulting p-value will not depend on the choice of the alternative hypothesis
in the class (see, e.g., [10, Chapter 3] for numerous examples; a simple
example can be found in [19, Section 4]). This is not true for e-values.
• There are many known efficient ways of computing p-values for testing
nonparametric hypotheses that are already widely used in science.
• In many cases, we know the distribution of p-values under the null hy-
pothesis: it is uniform on the interval [0, 1]. If the null hypothesis is
composite, we can test it by testing the simple hypothesis of uniformity
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for the p-values. A recent application of this idea is the use of conformal
martingales for detecting deviations from the IID model [20].
Advantages of e-values (starting from advantages mentioned by Shafer [15, Sec-
tion 1]):
• As Shafer [15] powerfully argues, betting scores are more intuitive than
p-values. Betting intuition has been acclaimed as the right approach to
uncertainty even in popular culture [5].
• Betting can be opportunistic, in Shafer’s words [15, Sections 1 and 2.2].
Outcomes of experiments performed sequentially by different research
groups can be combined seamlessly into a nonnegative martingale [17]
(see also [7, Section 1]).
• Mathematically, averaging e-values still produces a valid e-value, which
is far from being true for p-values [24]. This is useful in, e.g., multiple
hypothesis testing [22] and statistical testing with data splitting [19].
• E-values appear naturally as a technical tool when applying the duality
theorem in deriving admissible functions for combining p-values [21].
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